JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Memoir literature attests to the fact that some of the Volksdeutsche in eastern Europe contributed far more than silent acquiescence to the betrayal and murder of their Jewish neighbours during the Holocaust.3 Individual ethnic Germans stole Jewish property, participated in nazi-sponsored pogroms, and turned in Jews who tried to pass as Aryans. In more subtle ways too, the Volksdeutsche contributed to the explosion of genocidal anti-semitism in eastern Europe under nazi tutelage.
practically did invent the Volksdeutsche. In August 1941, for example, the nazi murder squad 'Einsatzgruppe B' reported from Smolensk that it had located a number of ethnic Germans. According to the report, however, intermarriage had so alienated those people from their roots that their claim to 'Germanness' was now tentative at best. Despite that admission, the Einsatzgruppe considered it in Germany's 'ethnic-political interests' to carve out a special status for those dubious Volksdeutsche in relation to the rest of the population. Accordingly, the Einsatzgruppe requested additional allocations of food and preferential treatment with regard to housing for the group.7 For the purposes of the Einsatzgruppe, the existence of people who could be labelled 'Volksdeutsche' was more important than the cultural or racial authenticity of such claims.
In a fundamental way, the dichotomy in nazi racial policy between Jews and Volksdeutsche created incentives for open support of anti-semitic activity. Nazi regulations made ethnic Germans the prime beneficiaries of property stolen from Jews. When Germans and their helpers deported and murdered Jews, they often reassigned the homes left vacant to ethnic Germans who either came from the region in question or had been resettled there. 8 The Einsatzgruppen who slaughtered Jews in the Soviet Union in 1942 also distributed 'loot, cattle, and harvesting machines' to the ethnic German population, 'making available the houses and belongings of Jews and so on'.9 On Himmler's order, various agencies distributed to the people identified as ethnic Germans under the nazis' resettlement programme clothing and household effects seized from Jews who had been killed in death camps and elsewhere.10 Jewish belongings, from thermos bottles to baby carriages, mirrors and sunglasses, were collected for the Volksdeutsche. Instructions to relhvant agencies stressed the importance of removing the Jewish star from all clothing. 11 Jews who experienced expropriation witnessed how greed increased the ranks of their enemies. Many of the most eager predators, some Jewish observers noted, the newly minted ethnic Germans, were in fact their old Polish or Ukrainian neighbours. A Jewish survivor from Radomsko recalled a Polish chemist who 'declared himself a Volksdeutsche' in order to take over a family enterprise that manufactured paints and dyes.12 Another survivor from the same town suggested that a Ukrainian family simply 'became Volksdeutsche' in order to claim the flat of a Jewish man who collected antiques.13 Meanwhile, an official report submitted to the Foreign Office in April 1944 confirmed that, in Hungary, the 'sanitizing actions' of invading German troops engaged in 'the solution of the Jewish question' had indeed had very favourable effects for ethnic Germans there.14 And once in possession of Jewish belongings, the ethnic Germans retained a vested interest in promoting the nazi cause. Nazi racial policy had given them what they had and their continued claim to those possessions rested on the racialist assumptions inherent in the National Socialist world view.
There were negative incentives as well to induce potential ethnic Germans to comply with nazi racial policy. The relevant regulations factored political reliability into determinations of ethnicity. The 'Deutsche Volksliste' was set up in 1941 to gather information on ethnic Germans and divide them into four categories, ranging from the 'pure and politically clean' specimens of category one to the 'renegades' of category four who had to be won back to 'Germanness'. Members of all four groups qualified for resettlement. Politically undesirable men and women, however, were to be sent to concentration camps. Moreover, SS and police officers were to supervise the Germanization process; in cases where parents neglected the Germanic training of their offspring, the children were to be taken away and given to other homes.5l In February 1942, Himmler himself ordered that people of German ancestry who failed to put themselves on the list could be sent to concentration camps. Nazi policies regarding the Volksdeutsche exacerbated antisemitism by stirring up greed for possessions seized from Jewish victims. But there was another, less obvious, way that the concept of 'ethnic Germanness' fostered hatred. The very tenuousness of the notion, which we might expect to have mitigated its destructive effects, in fact served to worsen the plight of Jews in eastern Europe.
Nazi ideology assumed clear-cut categories. It expected ethnic Germans to be easily identifiable -from their appearance, language, habits of living and qualities such as cleanliness, willingness to work hard and devotion to National Socialism.16 But when nazi authorities tried to implement policies regarding the Volksdeutsche, they found that concept to be full of contradictions, unclarities and absurdities. Over decades and centuries, settlers from German-speaking Europe had intermarried with their neigh-bours. Many had changed their religious allegiances, adopted or adapted cultural practices, abandoned the German language or transformed it in ways alien to the German ear. Nazi authorities used a combination of cumbersome bureaucracy and simple arbitrariness in their attempts to sort out this ethnic mix. The results, however, often disappointed believers in racial purity.
In 1944, for example, SS reports from across occupied eastern Europe complained bitterly about the absence of qualities associated with Germanness among the supposed ethnic Germans. SS officials in the Wartheland grumbled that the Volksdeutsche sent from Russia spoke only Polish, Russian or Ukrainian and had forgotten how to work.17 Other Gau authorities protested that the ethnic Germans they were expected to resettle lacked proper German family values. As soon as their husbands were out of the picture, one reporter carped, the women took up with Ukrainians and Poles. The men, the account continued, were no better; they slept with Polish women and assumed the cultural habits of Poles, while the youths were lazy and promiscuous. 18 So instead of finding pockets of pure Germanness preserved in the east, observers from Germany discovered ethnic Germans who had been influenced by the culture of their neighbours, even in some cases their Jewish neighbours. A German Protestant visitor to colonies of Volksdeutsche in Poland remarked that their language reflected a 'Jewish jargon'.19 Some ethnic Germans had even married Jews. In 1944, the resettlement programme for Volksdeutsche in Galicia encountered such a case. An ethnic German woman who had divorced her Jewish husband applied for resettlement. The SS questioned whether she or her children qualified for inclusion in the programme. It was Himmler who ultimately decided that the mother could be accepted for resettlement without the two children. They could only enter Germany as charges of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, and only if they were sterilized.20
Contemporaries did not fail to notice the many difficulties associated with defining Volksdeutsche. When the Ministry of Justice proposed a new marriage law, it planned to prohibit German citizens from marrying foreigners. Drafters of the law wanted to make an exception for ethnic Germans, but 'the difficulty of delineating ethnic Germans in a clear and unambiguous way' persuaded them not to do so.21 Jewish observers, too, noted the hollowness of the notion of Volksdeutsche. A Polish survivor describes members of a putatively ethnic German organization, the Selbstschutz, as 'people from our town, Poles'. With the nazi presence, she pointed out, they 'suddenly heard the call of their German blood! Mostly they were scum: ex-jailbirds, card-sharps, thieves, petty (and not so petty!) crooks'.22
Given the difficulties of defining Volksdeutsche, aspiring ethnic Germans in the east found the easiest way to prove themselves good Germans was to prove themselves good nazis. And the easiest way to establish nazi credentials was by endorsing and actively implementing attacks on Jews. Nazi authorities further encouraged that tendency by fostering an atmosphere of uncertainty around the identification of Volksdeutsche. They constantly altered rules and regulations, making it possible for ethnic Germans to be reclassified or even declassified. In While the ethnic German churches took on traits of nazi antisemitism, nazi authorities in eastern Europe also showed some willingness to accommodate the piety of the Volksdeutsche when it furthered their own ends. Such compromises reflected contradictions within nazism about the nature and place of Christianity. At the same time, these concessions made it easier for ethnic Germans to embrace genocidal anti-semitism while adhering to their religious traditions.
Nazi ideologues liked to claim that their ideas about race had nothing to do with religious considerations; in reality, however, even their putatively racial definition of Jewishness was based on religion -the faith of one's grandparents was the determining factor. Conversely, when it came to defining Volksdeutsche, membership in a Christian church was not enough, since most of the ethnic Germans' neighbours were Christian as well. At the same time, the variety of denominational affiliations among ethnic Germans made it impossible to employ more specific religious distinctions. Thus, while the nazis used religion to separate Jews from non-Jews, they needed other criteria to differentiate ethnic Germans from non-German Christians.
Despite the ideological and practical problems that Christianity posed with regard to the Volksdeutsche, under some conditions the nazis were prepared to use religion to win support from ethnic Germans for their racial goals. In early 1943, for example, SS officials suspended their resistance to pandering to ethnic German piety long enough to appoint some additional clergy for Volksdeutsche in the Generalgouvernement. Internal correspondence made it clear that the gesture was primarily symbolic, calculated as a way to enhance ethnic German loyalty. National Socialist officials selected the most politically reliable clergy they could find, but in such small numbers that they would be virtually ineffective, except to convince the Volksdeutsche that the nazis were on their side.4" Eight pastors from Transylvania, home to a branch of the Institute for Research into and Elimination of Jewish Influence in German Church Life, were finally sent to minister to their ethnic German brethren in Poland.41 Through this concession, nazi authorities hoped to tighten the bond between the piety of the Volksdeutsche and the anti-Jewish cause.
By facilitating the fusion of Christian anti-Judaism and nazi antisemitism, the concept of Volksdeutsche helped produce something both more virulent and destructive than the former and more effective than the latter alone. The revised anti-semitism that resulted from that alliance was more vitriolic than traditional Christian anti-Judaism because it abandoned the idea of potential conversion of Jews in favour of a policy of extermination. It was more effective than nazi ideas alone because the churches' willingness to tolerate and even promote it generated a broader base of support.
Careful attention to the concept of 'Volksdeutsche' and to the history of its employment in nazi hands shows it could neither be articulated coherently nor substantiated empirically. Yet, instead of impeding the advancement of nazism's genocidal plans, the very tenuousness of the notion of 'Volksdeutsche' actually contributed to the intensification of anti-semitism. In this way, the National Socialist understanding of 'Volksdeutsche' proved itself to be not only conceptually bankrupt, but morally disastrous as well. 9. See report issued by the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, 'Ereignismel-
